

THE PROBLEM  
OF THE APOSTOLIC WITNESS  
AND THE HISTORICAL JESUS:  
A STUDY OF SCHUBERT M. OGDEN'S CHRISTOLOGY

WONG KUN CHUN, ERIC

SUPERVISOR: DR. PHILIP SHEN

A THESIS  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF DIVINITY

DIVISION OF THEOLOGY  
GRADUATE SCHOOL  
THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

MAY 1986

471287

thesis

BT

83.57

W64



## CONTENT

	Page
Abstract	i
Acknowledgments	ii
Abbreviations	iv
Introduction	1
Chapters	
I His Basic Concepts	4
1. Appropriateness	4
2. Credibility	6
II His Objection to Other Christologies	15
1. Traditional	15
2. Revisionary	18
III His Christology	29
1. Love and Freedom	29
2. Appropriateness	31
3. Credibility	34
IV The Central Problem	41
1. Apostolic Witness	41
2. Historical Jesus	47
V Critical Reflections	54
1. A Methodological Query	54
2. An Asian Query	62
Conclusion	65
Bibliography	70



ABSTRACT

Ogden uses two criteria, appropriateness and credibility, in formulating a christology. By using these two criteria, he criticizes both traditional and revisionary christologies. Traditional christologies are now no longer credible to our human understanding, while revisionary christologies are not appropriate to Christian faith, or more precisely, to the apostolic witness. Using the ideas of existential philosophy and process theology, he then establishes his christology of freedom and love.

But to use the apostolic witness to Jesus Christ as the appropriate subject of his christology, instead of Jesus Christ himself, as in other christologies, presents a problem. Has he forsaken Jesus Christ as the foundation of Christianity? Ogden's answer is no. For the apostolic witness is, in fact, itself rooted in Jesus Christ. A distinction is made between "empirical-historical Jesus", and "existential-historical Jesus". The former refers to the so-called "historical Jesus", while the latter, to the same historical Jesus as contained in the apostolic witness. In this sense the apostolic witness to Jesus Christ is the appropriate and only subject of Christology.



ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Philip Shen, who helped me from the formulating of this thesis to the correcting of the grammatical mistakes throughout the process.

I would like also to thank Professor Schubert Ogden, Professor of Theology in Perkins School of Theology, The Southern Methodist University. In response to my inquiry, he sent me some materials, including his response to the critics, a complete list of his published writings (now incorporated as part I of the bibliography at the end of this thesis), and other bibliography and review articles.

I wish also to thank the faculty and students of the Department of Religion and Theology Division for their guidance and encouragement throughout my six years studies in the University.

Finally I want to thank Miss Shirley Yeung, who typed this thesis.

The thesis is dedicated to Loretta Leung, who has been a constant friend through these years, in difficult as well as good times.

ABBREVIATIONS

## Books of S.M. Ogden

- CM      Christ without Myth: A Study Based on the  
Theology of Rudolf Bultmann (1961)
- RG      The Reality of God and Other Essays (1966)
- FF      Faith and Freedom: Toward a Theology of  
Liberation (1979)
- PC      The Point of Christology (1982)



## INTRODUCTION

Christology can be regarded as one of the central themes of Christian theology. To me, to study christology is to learn the heart of theology. I have chosen the christology of Schubert Ogden, a living American theologian, for my thesis because I want to learn theology from him, especially concerning the contemporary christological discussion.

During my studies and discussions with my adviser, I found that the apostolic witness to Jesus on which Ogden's christology is based is interesting as well as instructive. Hence the choice of subject for this thesis.

Each kind of theology has a set of presuppositions which, in turn, affects the whole framework of that theology. The presuppositions of a theologian may be manifested as his basic concepts in doing theology. Ogden is no exception. He presupposes that theology and hence christology must be intelligible today, but finds that this is not the case of christologies today as well as in the past.

The first chapter of this thesis deals with Ogden's basic concepts. We then examine how he uses the crite-



ria of appropriateness and credibility to reject traditional and modern revisionary christologies (chapter two), before we present Ogden's christology (chapter three). It is a methodological problem when Ogden bases his christology on the apostolic witness to Jesus, rather than on the historical Jesus, who is commonly asserted as the subject of any christology (chapter four). Before the final conclusion, we present a critical reflection in which we query Ogden's basic concepts and his method in formulating his christology as well as christology's relevance to Asia (chapter five).

The problem in chapter four is, in fact, the focus of the thesis. The first half of this chapter tries to clarify Ogden's standpoint concerning the apostolic witness to Jesus as the christological subject. In the second half, we let Ogden respond to criticism made to the apostolic witness. And we try to participate in the above dialogue in the fifth and last chapter.

In preparing this thesis, we try to keep close to Ogden himself and let him speak. Therefore, the sources used, with a few exceptions, are primary (especially his book The Point of Christology in 1982).

In chapter four, the main references are to J. Hick's criticism in The Journal of Religion, 1984, and Ogden's response to critics, including Hick, presented in the Currents in Contemporary Christology Group, sponsored by the American Academy of Religion in December 1984.

Theological constructions including christological formulations are hardly perfect. Moreover, it would be no surprise if Ogden would further develop his ideas as long as he is still living. So our study of Ogden in this thesis is only part of an ongoing process.



Being a contemporary theologian, Schubert Ogden is concerned with the Christian message, whether it is credible or understandable for today. This concern leads him to establish two criteria, namely, appropriateness and credibility, in judging any theological statement. Theology must attempt to understand God in a way that is appropriate to the Christian witness and understandable in terms of human existence (FF 17). When the Christian message is thus presented, people are challenged to make a responsible decision either to accept or to reject this message or witness (FF 29).

Similarly, any christology of reflection today or in the past, in Ogden's view, must satisfy these two criteria. Christology has to be appropriate to the meaning of the apostolic witness, as well as credible to human existence when judged by common human experience and reason (PC 4).

#### 1. Appropriateness

Ogden himself is aware of the difficulty of applying the criterion of appropriateness in theology. He cannot accept scriptures as "the standard or norm



of theological appropriateness that Protestant theologians have traditionally given". It is because the New Testament writings as a whole are not original witness to Jesus Christ, and thus not truly apostolic (FF 45). But how does Ogden understand to be what is truly original apostolic witness?

Ogden believes that the truly apostolic witness is contained in the earliest layer of witness as found in the New Testament. We can reconstruct them through historical-critical study of the Synoptic Gospels. This apostolic witness is contained in the New Testament canon because one of the criteria of forming this canon was by the determination whether a writing is apostolic or not. This criterion enables the New Testament canon we have today to be, at least partially, apostolic (FF 45-46).

Ogden adds later a theological reason why all Christian witness and theology necessarily depend on this apostolic witness. It is because Jesus Christ is the "primal authorizing source". The authority of the apostolic witness is derived from him, the primal authorizing source. Jesus Christ can be regarded as the primal authorizing source because he is the decisive re-presentation of the ultimate reality of God and its meaning to us (PC 102-103).



## 2. Credibility

Ogden wants to explicate the Christian message to the secular world because he regards this is the very nature of the theological task (CM 17). There are two ways of explicating the Christian faith today. Firstly, theological task must "deal with the problems and tasks of the present". Secondly, it must "maintain constant conversation with analogous attempts made in the past" (CM 15). We shall see later when Ogden presents his christology, he identifies the present problems of the world as well as criticizes other past attempts in christological formulation.

The true significance of the Christian message will be fully disclosed when we interpret the event of Jesus Christ "not as an objective event of the past, but a personal appeal addressed to our present self-understanding" (CM 94). This is the method we commonly called "existential interpretation". By using this method, theologians explicate the old message about Jesus to the secular world now. In other words, its aim is to find out the existential meaning of the old message to us.



## a) Existential Interpretation

Ogden regards the question of christology to be an existential one. To illustrate: considering the title "Son of God" in John 1:18, he argues that the implication of this christological assertion is not only who Jesus is, but also who God is (PC 25). Considering also the seven claims of Jesus, e.g., "I am the bread of Life" in the same Gospel, Ogden argues that the more appropriate translation, based on Bultmann's interpretation, should be "The Bread of Life-- it is I [Jesus]". It means that the real question (who Jesus the being is) is, in fact, "Who or what is the Bread of Life?" (PC 26). This is clearly concerned with the ultimate existence of human beings. So, for christology, there are three questions together:

Who am I (our self-understanding)?

Who is God (the ultimate reality)?

Who is Jesus (meaning of ultimate reality to us)?

In fact, they are the existential questions (with the ultimate meaning of one's very existence as a human being), or the question of faith (basic presupposition underlying behind it), or the religious question (the above two ques-



tions asked and answered in the primary form of culture) (PC 27-30). The existential question has two essential aspects, i.e., metaphysical and moral, each implying the other (PC 34-35). By answering the question who God is, we "identify someone or something that decisively re-presents God", namely, Jesus, who is in the position of relating human existence to the ultimate reality (PC 37).

Firstly, concerning the question "Who am I?", Ogden regards man's "desire for reassurance, and for a general confidence about the future" are the "limiting questions at the level of self-conscious belief" (RG 31). Ogden interprets the parable of the Last Judgment in Matthew 25: 31-46 as not intending to express that we must confess faith in Jesus Christ, but that we must understand ourselves in a given situation of our authentic existence that is an original possibility of our life before God (CM 144). Our possibility to actualize our self-understanding or self-existence is rooted in our relation to the ultimate source of our existence (CM 140). Therefore, Ogden believes that faith in God is finally unavoidable because it is "inescapable at the deeper level of our actual existence" (RG 42). In this sense, he agrees with the say-



ing that "Man without God is dehumanized" (RG 46).

Secondly, concerning the question "Who is God?", Ogden thinks that if theology is credible and relevant to human existence, its statements "must be at least implicitly about man and his possibility of self-understanding". In this understanding, any statements about God and God's activity are statements about human existence, and vice versa" (CM 137). This is the fact that we must need process philosophy, apart from existentialism, to explicate Christian faith.

Thirdly, concerning the question "Who is Jesus?", Ogden affirms that Jesus as the Christ is the decisive re-presentation (or presenting again through concepts and symbols) of God's gift and demand of faith, which will not cease to be present in our existence (FF 55). The life of Jesus represents our original possibility of existence before God. Jesus Christ bears the eternal word of God's love, which is the transcendent meaning of all creatures, and before which final event we must decide our own existence (CM 160).



In considering the above three questions, we notice that the existential question of christology helps us to grasp the meaning of the ultimate reality to us through Jesus Christ, who acts as the decisive re-presentation of ultimate reality to human beings. On the other hand, Ogden is also aware of the inadequacy of this method when he interprets the Christian faith in existential terms. Ogden criticizes Bultmann's existential interpretation, firstly, as making the Christian faith to be merely our freedom from the past and openness for the future which constitute possibility of our authentic existence (CM 113). Secondly, this interpretation undercuts the understanding of human beings before God, according to the New Testament (CM 115). And finally, we cannot say we need Jesus Christ in any clear and specific way, but only a new self-understanding in overcoming the hindrance of the possibility of our authentic existence (CM 121).

Existential interpretation, in other words, can at most speak about God and his activity in terms of human existence; theology is in danger of becoming anthropology. The reason behind this problem in existential interpretation is due to its underlying existential philosophy which is inadequate when



we want to speak about God, or theology. But to do so in terms of traditional theism is unacceptable to secular human beings today. Ogden therefore seeks a more appropriate philosophy, in speaking about God. This leads to process theology.

#### b) Process Theology

It is not the aim here to examine process philosophy or theology. We limit ourselves only to its relevant ideas in Ogden's christology, i.e., how Ogden uses these ideas to talk about God objectively, in order not to reduce theology to anthropology as existentialism does.

To begin with, Ogden takes "freedom" as the key concept in process metaphysics. Metaphysics, he understands, is the

form of critical reflection which seeks to make fully explicit and understandable the most fundamental presuppositions of all our experience and thought, or, . . . the most universal principles that are the strictly necessary conditions of the possibility of anything whatever (FF 73).

In this metaphysics, anything that is is the result of the process of creative synthesis, or of self-creation. It freely creates itself.



During this process, it freely responds to other things that are either self-created in the past, or possibilities which belong to the future (FF 74-76).

There are two consequences that are of critical theological importance. Firstly, there is nothing (including God) that can completely determine the being of others. It is because the others have the freedom to respond to it, either accepting or rejecting it partly or totally. Secondly, everything (including God), is being determined partially by the being of the others. It is because during the self-creating process, nothing can actualize itself without the existing data provided by the others (FF 79). In theology, it means "God loves humankind" means that God acts on human beings for their sake. But, human beings have the liberty to accept or reject God's love.

Classical theism takes the nature of God to be absolute in itself. But that is only a one-sided concept of God, for God has to be related to all things at the same time. The only satisfactory concept of God, in neo-classical theism, takes God to be two-sided or "dipolar" (RG 48). This results in the view that "God is literally becoming as well as being,



and hence the relative as well as the absolute, the changing as well as the unchanging, the contingent as well as the necessary" (PC 143).

The concept of this God may further be clarified by the concept of love. From our common experience, love has two poles: loving and being loved. This is part of the dipolar characteristics in our relation with others, as we are acting on and being acted upon by others. By this analogy, we may understand what God is like in being dipolar. In fact, the concept of love may help to describe the structure of ultimate reality in itself. God as boundless love is a "distinct center of universal interaction, . . . being acted on by all things as well as acting on them" (PC 145).

This description of the nature of love as interaction applies not only to God in relation to the world but also to the inter-relation of things in the world. On the human level the most significance of conscious and pruposive action is clear. To love one's neighbout as oneself means to act and be acted upon in relation to them in full freedom and responsibility. It means

also to support structures of human relationship in one's culture and society, in which justice and human rights are established, and the possibility of authentic existence is made available to every person.

To sum up, Ogden applies two criteria in formulating theological statements, first, whether they are appropriate to the norm of apostolic witness, and second, whether they are credible today. A christology today should explicate the meaning of the apostolic witness to us, in answering the three inseparable questions concerning God, Jesus, and ourselves, in terms of existential interpretation. But it is process philosophy or theology that provides the terms to explicate metaphysically the concept of God.



## II OBJECTION TO OTHER CHRISTOLOGIES

Ogden is critical of the formulation of christology from the ground of the words and acts of the historical Jesus. He is concerned with whether such a christological formulation as developed in the past is appropriate to the apostolic witness and is credible to human understanding today.

In order to understand how Ogden establishes his christology, which he hopes is both appropriate and credible in our situation, by using the apostolic witness to Jesus, we examine how he rejects christologies of the past, as well as, of the present in this chapter.

### 1. Traditional Christology

Ogden believes that the traditional christology based on scripture and dogma is problematic. The first reason is the change of the modern scientific view of the world and the modern understanding of human existence from the past, as formulated by R. Bultmann (PC 6).

The world view of the New Testament's time was a three folded one, with the heaven above, the earth central, the hell beneath (Bultmann 1954: 1). At that time, people believed that supernatural powers, whether good or bad, might participate in their lives. These powers influenced also their behaviour.

Today, with the knowledge of modern natural science, we can hardly understand the world view of the past. But, our world is a regulated whole governed by natural laws. Our existence, on the one hand, is no longer bound by supernatural powers, but still by the political, social, economic injustices of our society. On the other hand, our existence need to be actualized if we want to have an authentic one.

Our different world view from the past thus leads us to a different understanding of human existence, and hence a different moral principle. It is because Ogden believes, according to the view point of modern anthropology, our morality is rooted in our world view (PC 31-32). Furthermore, if we try to understand the christology of scripture literally, we fail inevitably to get its meaning or its truth (PC 6).

Secondly, even though the first reason is enough to explain why many theologians cannot accept the



traditional christology of scripture, Ogden, nevertheless, finds that there are three further difficulties in the traditional christology of scripture and dogma:

- a) The metaphysical concepts and religious symbols of the traditional doctrine of incarnation are now outmoded and inadequate in some important respects. It is even questionable whether this doctrine is appropriate to the apostolic witness, and whether it is based upon adequate christological reflection (PC 7-8).
- b) The traditional doctrine of incarnation is unable to give "any real content of its talk of Jesus as both God and man" (PC 8). Through the long history of attempts to present a reasoned account of Christ as both fully human and fully divine, the church has never quite succeeded in offering a consistent or convincing picture (PC 9).
- c) The traditional doctrine of incarnation "has usually run into the difficulty of implicitly denying the true humanity of Jesus Christ" (PC 10). Not only does this difficulty refer to the "neo-Chlacedonianism", but it also refers to the "kenoticism" emergent in nineteenth-century theology (PC 10).

## 2. Revisionary Christology

Since Traditional christology is problematic, Ogden himself, as other contemporary theologians, explores the alternative of a "revisionary" christology. By doing so, he sets two requirements. Firstly, the meaning and the truth of the revisionary christology must be founded upon the earliest Christian witness. Secondly, it must be understandable today. In other words, the revisionary christology must be appropriate to the apostolic witness and be credible to human understanding today.

We have just noted what the problems of understanding the New Testament are. Ogden believes that we cannot take this historical source literally to reconstruct the revisionary christology. In order to find out its meaning, as in Bultmann's demythologizing, we have to interpret it existentially thus recognizing the truth it expresses. In the second criterion, namely credibility, Ogden thinks that the revisionary christology has to provide alternative metaphysical concepts and religious symbols in order that we may at least understand what it wants to convey to us today (PC 12).



Contemporary theologians use different methods and approaches to handle the New Testament as "empirical-historical" sources, in making revisionary christologies. Ogden thinks that they are unsuccessful because the New Testament itself is not an appropriate source to reconstruct the historical Jesus. And even if they could find it, Ogden insists that the historical Jesus is not the appropriate subject to reconstruct the revisionary christology. Furthermore, contemporary theologians "tend to exhibit more extensive agreement with the traditional positions", thus hindering them to present alternative concepts and symbols for our understanding today. This is because their "way of asking the question of christology is not really different from that of traditional christology, however different their way of answering it" (PC 13-15).

According to Ogden, they are agreed on three specific points.

a) Who is Jesus: the Being of Jesus

Ogden thinks that "Who is Jesus?" is the question christology properly asks and answers. This is understood that revisionary theologians are



"asking about the being of Jesus in himself as distinct from asking about the meaning of Jesus for us" (PC 15-16).

Since we all know the problems of traditional christology, revisionary theologians also realize the difficulties behind it when we think and speak of Jesus as "uniquely God in man". This is understood to say that Jesus' nature is God, as distinguished from ordinary people. Nevertheless, they do think and speak of Jesus as "uniquely man of God" whatever his relation to other human beings. In existential terms, Jesus has actualized perfectly his possibility or authentic self-understanding. It is clear now, to Ogden, that even though revisionary theologians present another answer to the christological question, they ask, actually, the same question: What is the being of Jesus in himself (PC 16)?

In fact, Ogden does not say that christology excludes the question of the being of Jesus. But to assume as revisionary theologians do that "this is the only question christology answers", is the mistake they make (PC 27-28).

Yet, one may argue for the revisionary theologians: they do not ask "who is Jesus?" as the



only question, but as the primary question for christology. It is because one has to know what/who the being of Jesus is (the first question) before one can infer the meaning of this Jesus for us today (the second question).

To Ogden, these are two loosely connected questions, besides the difficulty of historical inquiry involved, one may just ask either one of them, but they are not directly coherent to each other. As we have seen in chapter one, this question: "who is Jesus?" is, in fact, the third of three inseparable questions. The other two questions are "who is God?" and "who am I?", which are of equal importance. He explains again:

In other words, these other two aspects of the christological question are not only essential to it, they are also fundamental to its third aspect. For unless one were already asking about one's own identity and the identity of the mysterious ultimate reality upon which one's being and meaning are dependent, one neither would nor could ask the question "Who is Jesus?" in the distinctive sense in which it is asked in asking the question of christology (PC 29).

Therefore, the question christology answers is not simple but complex. And Ogden calls it an "existential-historical" question which does

ask about what has actually happened, but, by asking so, it asks about, at the same time, its meaning for us here and now in the present, or its meaning for the earliest Christians, rather than its being in itself then and there in the past (PC 39-40).

b) Who is Jesus: the Historical Subject of the Christological Question

If the christological question concerning Jesus himself is an existential one, the christological formulation must then point to Jesus' "decisive significance for human existence by asserting that it is through him that the meaning of God for us, and hence the meaning of ultimate reality for us, is decisively re-presented" (PC 41-42).

Revisionary christologies thus identify the Jesus, who is said to be Christ, as the historical Jesus, i.e., "the actual Jesus of history insofar as he can be known to us today by way of empirical-historical inquiry using the writings of the New Testament as sources" (PC 16-17). They are concerned with the determination (by us) of the identity of the historical Jesus.



Thus, the subject of the christological assertion is then inevitably the so-called historical Jesus (PC 43). Therefore, they argue for "the historical possibility as well as the theological necessity of the quest of the historical Jesus" (PC 17).

But Ogden believes, on the contrary, that the quest of the historical Jesus for christological assertion is historically impossible and theologically unnecessary.

Historically, Ogden says, "all we can ever hope to talk about is not what Jesus said and did, but what Jesus was heard to have said and seen to have done by those on whom experience and memory of him are utterly dependent" (PC 53). In other words, it is not possible to verify or falsify conclusively what Jesus has said or done empirically in purely historical inquiry. It is, therefore, a doubtful point to take the historical Jesus as the subject of christological assertion.

To Ogden, christological assertion may not be necessarily based on the historical Jesus, but rather on the stratum of the earliest witness,

or the apostolic witness to him. This witness is, in fact, "the normative witness of faith by which the appropriateness of all christological formulations must be justified" (PC 62).

Theologically, even though the quest of the historical Jesus is historically possible, Ogden thinks that this quest is not theologically necessary. It is because "the real subject of the christological assertion is not the historical Jesus", but rather the "existential-historical Jesus" which is experienced through the historical Jesus by the earliest Christian (PC 56). When they presented their existential experiences, the writers or redactors of the Gospels were presenting the "existential-historical Jesus".

In other words, the earliest witnesses to Jesus were not about "what Jesus had said and done, but rather what God had said and done and was still saying and doing precisely through Jesus, and hence through their own witness of faith" (PC 59). That is to say, their assertions were concerned with the meaning of Jesus for them as he still confronted them in their present (PC 59).



From these historical and theological considerations, can we infer that the apostolic witness is either historically possible or theological relevant for us today? We shall come to it later.

c) Who is Jesus: the Conditions of Asserting a Christological Predicate

Revisionary theologians regard Jesus, first of all, as a human being. They are unable to meet the problem of the uncertainty involved in determining who Jesus really was, because, according to Ogden, there "can never be any operational distinction between Jesus as he really was and Jesus as he is represented in the earliest of these sources". The same applies to any talk about Jesus' own self-understanding (his own existence as a human person, subjectively), "as distinct from how he was understood to have understood himself by these same earliest witness" (PC 67).

Thus, Ogden rejects the modern revisionists' attempt to reconstruct the faith of Jesus, the religion of Jesus etc. (PC 68). When we want to infer Jesus' consciousness of self-understand-

ing from the earliest witness, we meet two difficulties: firstly, "the data base that is required. . . indefinitely exceeds what could be reasonably claimed in the case of human being"; and secondly, "our earliest sources concerning Jesus provide insufficient evidence of his inner and outer development" (PC 70-71). To understand one's self understanding or consciousness is difficult and to understand completely someone's who lived in the past is well nigh impossible.

Ogden even makes a very sharp distinction between the primal authority (God) and the self-understanding (of Jesus or of us) that God authorizes (PC 78). And he thinks that revisionary christologies "obscure this difference in principle" (PC 79). It is because when revisionary theologians concentrate on Jesus' self-understanding in making their revisionary christologies, they tends to ignore who authorizes him. As we have mentioned in chapter one, the christological question is not simple, but complex. It is concerned also with the ultimate reality itself or God himself and its meaning for us.



Ogden thinks that when we assert that Jesus is the decisive re-presentation of God, we do not say or imply "how Jesus did understand himself but rather how everyone ought to understand himself or herself". This is why the christological assertion calls for our decision to accept it or reject it even today. Therefore, however Jesus understood himself does not affect his position to be the decisive re-presentation of God (PC 78).

In this sense, the titles ascribed to Jesus in the New Testament, such as Christ, Lord, Son of Man, Son of God, etc. are all ways of designating such a decisive representation of God, thereby authorizing our authentic understanding. They are, indeed, ways of formulating one and the same christological assertion of Jesus' decisive significance for human existence (PC 75-76).

Thus, any ways of asserting that Jesus is the decisive representation of the ultimate reality for us may be justified as an appropriate christological predicate. And to Ogden, it is the necessary and sufficient condition of any such assertion (PC 82). It means that a proper

christological assertion has two aspects: metaphysical and moral. It is because without the metaphysical aspect of such an assertion, the christology formulation does not provide a firm base for our understanding of the structure of the ultimate reality, and without the moral aspect, the christology formulated has got no meaning for us to act in relation to our fellow beings today (PC 82-83).

Now, we have shown how Ogden rejects contemporary theologians' attempts to reconstruct revisionary christologies. At the same time, we know Ogden's requirements in making a proper revisionary christology. We are now going to present Ogden's own christology in the following chapter.



### III HIS CHRISTOLOGY

Now, we come to Ogden's christology. In this chapter, we shall see how he argues for his christology of freedom and love to be both appropriate and credible, by asserting that Jesus is the Liberator. We expect that this christology of freedom and love should avoid the difficulties of the traditional and revisionary christologies emerged. In other words, it has to be based on the apostolic witness. At the same time, it should be an assertion that is concerned with the ultimate reality in relation to man's self-understanding and self-actualization.

#### 1. Love and Freedom

Ogden uses the concept of love to characterize the structure of the ultimate reality. Love is a common experience. It has two poles: loving and being loved. We experience loving and being loved by others, by accepting and being accepted by others. This is part of our relation with others, in acting on and being acted upon by them. According to Ogden, the structure of the ultimate reality or God, by the analogy of love, is characterized by two poles: to act on all things and being acted upon by all things (PC 145). The claim "God as the ultimate reality is boundless love" has two meanings. Primarily, it means that "we ourselves are free to exist



and act in love in relation to all our fellow creatures". Secondly, it means that "each of us is given and called to love beyond all of the limits of conventional human loving" (PC 144-145).

Freedom is another aspect of Ogden's christology. Ogden believes that our existence today is determined by both external and internal forces. Externally, it is the injustices of the society socially, economically, politically and culturally that makes the majority to be oppressed. Internally, it is, in existentialist terms, the limited actualization of our possibility of authentic self-understanding. Thus, negatively, the term freedom denotes freedom of ourselves from anything, including the injustices of the society, that would hinder unnecessarily our possibility of authentic existence. Positively, we help others, especially those who are oppressed socially, economically, politically, and culturally in the actualization of their possibility of authentic existence. This is the meaning of liberation.

Therefore, for a contemporary christology, it is relevant to our situation as well as to human



existence when Ogden asserts Jesus is the Liberator. This assertion fits everywhere where freedom is threatened or denied by external or internal forces. It is an assumption of Ogden that the problem of human existence, in terms of the limited actualization of the possibility of an authentic self-understanding is a universal one.

## 2. Appropriateness

The traditional measures (scripture alone, both scripture and tradition, Jesus himself--the so-called historical Jesus) are not suitable according to the criteria of appropriateness as the standard norm in reconstructing christology today (PC 97-98). We can no longer know exactly what the historical Jesus was, but we have to reconstruct the "originating witness of the apostles", from the New Testament writings, to the earliest stratum of Christian witness (PC 103). It is because the New Testament writings are not purely historical report, nor primary sources concerning the historical Jesus. Nevertheless, the historical Jesus is the "primal authorizing source" of the apostolic witness, which then has the "primary authority" derived from it. This is, in fact, "the only really significant meaning of 'Jesus' for Christian faith and witness" now and as it was from the beginning (PC 103).



Having established that the apostolic witness is the appropriate source of christological assertion, Ogden proceeds to present a christology of freedom and love interpreted from the apostolic witness.

Even though Paul may not be regarded as an apostle "in the strict sense of an original and originating witness to Jesus Christ", his kerygma can "claim sufficient support in Jesus' own proclamation to be theologically justified" (PC 109-110). It is because his understanding of Christ's cross and resurrection as "God's decisive act of liberation" opens up a possibility of self-understanding before God. This self-understanding is the same as Jesus' call to repentance and faith". Therefore, Paul's kerygma "can be judged appropriate by reference to the real Christian norm in Jesus himself" (PC 110-111). The message of this kerygma is clearly an existential one. Thus, we may well assume, even Ogden has not said explicitly, that the existential concern of human existence is universal, in spite of different time, space, and culture.

Mark 1:15 (The time is fulfilled, and the reign of God is at hand; repent, and believe in the gospel) bears the witness that Jesus has called for faith not in his own person, but in his word. This is



the word of the final judgment of God which has already been taking place. And Ogden infers that Jesus proclaims the word of God in order to confront the hearers to make the decision of their lives, "by definitively interpreting the will of God" (PC 115-117). But who is this God whose word and will are being proclaimed? The answer Ogden proposes is, it is the God of boundless love. Jesus represents love because his proclamation, which calls for repentance, means God's love "as the gift and demand of authentic existence in faith and returning love" (PC 119).

Speaking of Jesus as the Christ or as the Son of Man (in such terms and categories as were available for the purpose), the earliest Christians affirmed explicitly what Jesus' implicitly claimed to be, namely, the decisive revelation of God's love. Ogden holds that Jesus' own interpretation of such terms and categories was at most implicit, and that there was no explicit christology in the earliest stratum of Christian witness, as was later developed (PC 120).

This earliest witness of the apostles is the witness of the faith in Jesus, but not a historical report about him. Therefore, the Gospel observes not what Jesus was historically, but what Jesus is to them existentially. Thus whatever assertions



made about Jesus would be an existential-historical assertion of what Jesus means, but not what Jesus meant, "in the sense that through him the gift and demand of God's boundless love are made fully explicit as authorizing our own possibility of authentic faith and love" (PC 122). The existence of faith through Jesus is a liberating and a liberated existence. It is an existence for the freedom of ourselves and others, and it is also an existence in the freedom that is the gift and demand of God's love (PC 123).

Thus, Ogden argues that the christology of freedom and love has got support from the apostolic witness to Jesus. The christological assertion that Jesus is the Liberator is appropriate to the apostolic witness. This christology is also credible to our situation.

### 3. Credibility

For our contemporary situation, Ogden believes that the quest for freedom and justice is the characteristics of modern secular culture. This quest for freedom has, in fact, determined the whole history of modern theology in the West (PC 89). People today throughout the world are increasingly concerned



with problems of injustice and suppression, which, in existentialist terms, hinder unnecessarily the actualization of the possibility of authentic self-understanding. Christian faith, and hence christology, thus need a "practically credible witness", beside the metaphysics side, in facing this contemporary quest for freedom and justice (PC 93).

In doing so, Ogden uses a theological method of de-ideologizing and political interpretation (which is analogous to Bultmann's method of de-mythologizing and existential interpretation), with both a negative and a positive side. The negative de-ideologizing method is to disengage the apostolic witness from the prevalent ideology of the world of New Testament time. Ideology means "a more or less comprehensive understanding of human existence, of how to exist and act as a human being, that functions to justify the interests of a particular group of individual . . ." (PC 94). Political interpretation aims at "explicating the implications of the Christian witness, specifically political aspect of moral responsibility" (PC 95). The central problem of politics, in Ogden's understanding, concerns "the use of power to establish justice, in the state and government but also throughout the whole social and cultural order". This is the specifically political aspect of moral responsibility.



We are now going to examine how Ogden argues that his christology of freedom and love can be credible metaphysically and morally according to common human experience and reason. It has to be metaphysical because metaphysics, to Ogden, is the "form of critical reflection" based on our thought and speech in the concern of the ultimate (PC 136). At the same time, it has to be moral because morality, governs our behaviour and our relation or interaction with other persons in a given society.

Metaphysically, Ogden believes that the christological assertion "Jesus is the Liberator" may be regarded as an assertion about our own existence (PC 131). It is because, as we have said before, a christological assertion or answer is concerned with three inseparable questions, namely, "Who is God?" (the question of ultimate reality). "Who am I?" (the question of self-understanding), and finally "Who is Jesus?" (the question of the relation between the two). For this third aspect of the christological question, Ogden has argued that it is appropriate to the apostolic witness.

Ogden is concerned with metaphysics because he believes that without a metaphysics description of



the structure of ultimate reality, we can never talk about God objectively. He proposes to use a "transcendental metaphysics" which is based on a neo-classical one. According to the neo-classical metaphysics, God is a "dipolar God", that is "literally becoming as well as being, and hence the relative as well as the absolute, the changing as well as the unchanging, the contingent as well as the necessary" (PC 143).

As the ultimate reality, God of boundless love means basically that "we ourselves are free to exist and act in love in relation to all our fellow creatures" (PC 144). God of boundless love means also that "each of us is given and called to love beyond all of the limits of conventional human loving" (PC 144-145). Ogden argues that love has two sides: to love and to be loved. If to love others is above all to accept others, and then to act on and be acted upon by others; therefore, the assertion God of boundless love implies that this ultimate reality not only acts on everything, but it is also being acted on by everything.

It is clear now, after the meaning of the structure of the ultimate reality has been explicated, that this structure of the ultimate reality or "God is boundless love" is credible "when judged in terms



of common human experience and reason" (PC 147). If we have to distinguish the criterion of credibility, the above one is the theoretical credibility. There remains a practical credibility in order to complete Ogden's proposal.

The formulation that Jesus is the Liberator is suitable for our situation today when the term liberation refers to "the freedom we have in Christ" (PC 149-150 quoting Gal. 2:4). Before Ogden presents his idea, he rejects two familiar alternatives in treating the relation between Christian freedom and political responsibility.

The first alternative that Ogden rejects is to identify Christian freedom with secular freedom, or with political action in the struggle for human liberation, or the fight for justice for an oppressed majority. Ogden points out that Christian freedom is more than merely political action (PC 150-151).

The second alternative that Ogden rejects is to separate Christian freedom from political responsibility. This position emphasizes the spiritual aspect of the Christian faith; it is pessimistic regarding the future of the society with no hope



for a better social order despite any efforts to improve it (PC 152-153).

Having rejected the above two alternatives, Ogden proposes a third one. That is to distinguish Christian freedom from political responsibility, but without separating them (PC 155-156). He argues firstly that the ultimate ground of Christian freedom is the liberating love of God and whose essential nature is "faith working through love" (PC 157-158). Then, our moral responsibility, as our response to God's love, or God's demand, is governed by this love of God. Therefore, the "moral implications of Christian freedom are always to seek justice" (PC 159). Ogden argues further that "if the love through which faith works in turn seeks justice and finds expression in it", this is clear "to say that Christian freedom does indeed imply political responsibility" (PC 159).

Christian freedom, finally, has got two meanings which can never be confused. Firstly, it means justice, "and hence freedom and equality, throughout society and culture". Secondly, it means Christians have the responsibility to help the oppressed majority to achieve their right (PC 163).

Thus, the christology of freedom and love, or the christological formulation that Jesus is the Liberator is appropriate to the apostolic witness; and is credible metaphysically and morally in our situation today.



#### IV THE CENTRAL PROBLEM

##### 1. The Apostolic Witness

Having examined how Ogden rejects traditional and revisionary christologies, which are either inappropriate to the earliest Christian witness or incredible to human common experience and reason today, we, in this chapter, try to understand how Ogden justifies himself in using the apostolic witness as an appropriate subject in establishing his existential christology.

From his early thought, we know that Ogden has already assumed that "the central conviction of the apostolic witness. . . intends to express that in the event Jesus of Nazareth something of ultimate significance for the whole history of mankind has been manifested" (CM 160). In other words, the apostolic witness itself is an existential interpretation of the historical Jesus, who is the bridge between the ultimate reality and human existence.

On the other hand, the source we have in the New Testament about Jesus Christ, in fact, is the apostolic witness to him, but not the so-called historical Jesus. Therefore, Ogden has to use not the historical



Jesus, but rather the apostolic witness as the practical subject in formulating a christological assertion. Nevertheless, Ogden retains the historical Jesus as the theoretical foundation of Christianity. We shall examine this in the following discussion.

As we have shown in chapter one, the christological question is an existential question, and thus a christological assertion is also an existential one. Any christological assertions by their very nature, are not only concerned with Jesus, but also God and human beings together. In the past, the apostolic witness was indeed, as an immediate experience about the historical Jesus, presenting their experience to their fellow people then and there. When these people accepted such a witness, they became Christians. Precisely, if we today can hear the apostolic witness from the past, we may also grasp its existential meaning for us today, assuming that its existential meaning is the same for all human beings, past or present. But this need to be explicated by using some philosophical tools, like existential philosophy and process theology. The existential meaning of the apostolic witness is credible for us when judged by our common human experience and reason.

Traditionalists or some revisionists, insist that the historical Jesus is the proper subject of



any christological assertions. Ogden rejects this. He thinks, firstly, "there can never be any operational distinction between Jesus as he really was and Jesus as he is represented in the earliest of these sources" (PC 67). Since there are no pure historical data concerning Jesus, and all the sources are inevitably presented by the earliest Christian witness, the quest of the historical Jesus will eventually become the quest of this apostolic witness (PC 84). Therefore, christological assertions need not be based on the purely historical Jesus, which creates serious difficulties, but rather on the apostolic witness itself, as recorded in the New Testament.

Yet, Ogden is aware that the temptation of abandoning the historical Jesus as the foundation of Christianity in his own framework. So, he writes,

the event that the New Testament witnesses as such mean in referring to Jesus does indeed belong to the origin of the Christian church, and so is an actual happening, prior to and independent of not only their own faith and witness, but even the original faith and witness of the apostles in which everything Christian originates. (PC 57)

What this passage wants to state is simply that even though the historical Jesus is no longer the real subject for christological assertions, the historical

Jesus is still the origin of the Christian church. Nevertheless, Ogden affirms that when we talk about Jesus, it is understood that the Jesus we know is that which comes through the apostolic witness (PC 57).

Furthermore, Ogden rejects the historical Jesus as the appropriate subject of any christological assertions by replacing it with the apostolic witness. Concerning the historical Jesus, no matter how they assumed what Jesus had spoken or acted, the earliest Christians did not assert it to the christological claim. It is because they regarded this claim as not about what Jesus has really spoken or acted but rather about what God has done through him. In other word, their assertions are concerned with the meaning of God through Jesus for us. According to this understanding, the Jesus of the apostolic witness is precisely the "existential-historical Jesus", rather than the so-called "historical Jesus" (PC 59).

Since both the traditionalists and revisionists have always insisted that the historical Jesus or the being of Jesus must be the subject of any christological assertions, Ogden argues that the being of Jesus is taken to be the proper subject only when



we understand that this being of Jesus is related to the ultimate reality, namely, God. And this shows the typically existential approach of Ogden, which leads him to say, "the subject of the christological assertion is Jesus in his meaning for us, not Jesus in his being in himself" (PC 60).

The claim or the assertion thus mentioned above is understood by the earliest Christians, what it wants to express is that Jesus is the decisive representation of God, "in the sense of the one through whom the meaning of God for us, and hence the meaning of ultimate reality for us, becomes fully explicit" (PC 82).

Following Ogden's own criticism of the quest of the historical Jesus, we may ask a parallel question to the apostolic witness as he does to those questers: What is really the apostolic witness in the New Testament? How can we obtain the most primitive apostolic witness? But to Ogden, I think, this is not an important question. The apostolic witness functions to express the faith concerning Jesus as the bridge between God and human beings. Thus, it does not matter whether the witnesses are primitive or not, they have the same function in expressing the ultimate truth

for us about Jesus.

To sum up, Ogden rejects traditionalists and revisionists using historical Jesus as the base for any christological assertions because we cannot get the real picture of the historical Jesus, and whatever the christological claims by the earliest Christians are, they do not assert what Jesus really did and really was, but what the meaning of this representation to them is. Therefore, the appropriate christological subject is not the historical Jesus, but the existential-historical Jesus understood by the apostolic witness.

From the above considerations, Ogden goes so far to say that "the empirical-historical Jesus has no bearing whatever on the point of christology. Whether Jesus did or did not teach any explicit christology, the claim made about him. . . may still be entirely appropriate" (PC 60).

Can we say then that Ogden has the intention, more or less, to ignore the historical fact in making his existential christology?



## 2. Historical Jesus

As Ogden himself admits, one of the most obvious challenges "with particular clarity" to his book The Point of Christology is J. Hick's review article "The Foundation of Christianity: Jesus or the Apostolic Message?", in The Journal of Religion in 1984 (Ogden 1984g: 1). By responding to this kind of criticism, Ogden stresses what his intention is. We are now using their dialogue to examine further the relation between the apostolic witness and historical Jesus in Ogden's christology.

The title of Hick's article has already indicated Hick's point of criticism. It seems to Hick that Ogden regards the objective historical research and "meaning-for-ourselves" to be mutually incompatible concerns in christology (Hick 1984: 364). Thus, Ogden "removes the responsibility for validating christological assertions from the historical Jesus (who does not, so far as we can discover, uphold a traditional christology) and places it instead in the preaching of the New Testament church" (Hick 1984: 365).

But, Ogden rejects this challenge, and regards Hick's criticism to have ignored his pivotal point



of the christological formulation (Ogden 1984g: 1). He explains that one should make a very clear distinction between the two terms "the empirical-historical Jesus" and "the existential-historical Jesus". That is, one must distinguish between two different ways of thinking and speaking about the historical figure whom we are wont to identify by the proper name 'Jesus' (Ogden 1984: 2). Thus, no matter how these two terms are used, they are both rooted in one historical figure, or "the fact of Jesus". In this regard, "Jesus does belong to the origin of the Christian church." The fact of Jesus is the foundation of Christianity.

To Ogden, the christological claims "that are made or implied about Jesus from the earliest witnesses are not subject to any empirical-historical control". He explains, however, "that all the claims that Christians make or imply about Jesus are beyond the control of empirical-historical inquiry should not be the only way to establish whether all christological formulations are appropriate even though the "empirical-historical inquiry is very definitely a theological necessity" in some cases (PC 62).

What then is the other way to establish the appropriateness of formulations? The answer, according to Ogden, is the apostolic witness.



Ogden claims that "existential-historical Jesus" presupposes the historical Jesus; the apostolic is also grounded in the historical Jesus, although we may not get a pure picture of that historical figure through empirical-historical inquiry.

Now it becomes clear that Hick's challenge concerning the foundation of Christianity is valid only when the historical Jesus and the apostolic witness are different, or more precisely, when they are mutually incompatible. Unfortunately, we can have no way to clarify this problem because no matter how advanced our historical inquiry is, we can never hope to know exactly what a historical figure has thought, spoken or done in his time. The relationship between the historical Jesus and the apostolic witness is not simple and different people may have different views.

Nevertheless, Hick's criticism may sharpen when we take the modern issue of the "Christ of Faith" against the "Jesus of History" into consideration. As it has been suggested, the christological debates today tend to repeat those of the ancient church. Roughly speaking, the Jesus of history School is parallel to the Ebionitism of the Antioch School; whereas the Christ of faith School is parallel to the Docetism of the Alexandria School (Braaten 1984: 518).



The issue reaches another peak when Hick complains that Ogden "does not at any point in his book mention the resurrection"<sup>1</sup>, which traditional christology may use in appealing to history (Hick 1984: 365). It seems to Hick that Ogden at this point and elsewhere stands too close to existentialism, by asking mainly the meaning of Jesus for us here and now, but tends to neglect or does not do justice to some vitally important historical issues, whether intended or not.

One may become puzzled when, on the one hand, Hick complains that Ogden ignores history; but on the other hand, Ogden himself claims that the historical Jesus is logically prior to the existential-historical Jesus.

To this point, I think, Ogden does not forsake Jesus as the foundation of Christianity theoretically in his christological formulation, because he can rightly argue that the apostolic witness is based on the historical Jesus, and thus the issue involved is not whether the historical Jesus is the foundation of Christianity, but how we understand the Jesus

---

1. There are at least two places Ogden mentions "resurrection" in his book (p.110, p.129), but he does not discuss its significance directly.



to be this foundation (Ogden 1984g: 3). Nevertheless, in spite of that, Ogden has not put the historical evidence into consideration when proposing his existential christology. In other words, Ogden's existential christology has not really given a clear place for the historical Jesus, but only his existential meaning to the apostles then and there in the past, and the meaning for us here and now.

It is ideal if both historical data and existential meaning can be combined together not only theoretically, but also practically in formulating a christological assertion. Since the Christian faith is not independent from history, otherwise it need not be "Christian". In this sense, Hick's complaint, even though severe, is still sound. He says,

To some, Jesus means God the Son dying on the cross to save us from our sins; to some he means true humanity, open and responsive to God, calling us to fulfill our own humanness; to Ogden he means love and freedom; to others he has meant the Aryan Christ of Nazism, authorizing a savage persecution of the Jews; and so on. But surely the real significance of Jesus cannot be as a cipher with different meaning for different people . . .  
(Hick 1984: 366-367).

This historical position of Hick stands clearly apart from Ogden's existential one. Of course, within Ogden's love and freedom, there can have no place for the Aryan



Christ of Naziam, even though they are both presumably relevant to some human needs. But what is important to notice is that Ogden would probably accept other christologies if they can meet the criteria of both appropriateness and credibility. On the contrary, Hick, by insisting on the historical basis of faith, aims at particular understanding of the historical Jesus, to make the historical Jesus to be the "real Christian canon", rather than the apostolic witness as such.

Therefore, in answering Hick's criticism, Ogden suggests, "it is not all the issue of whether Jesus is the foundation of Christianity; it is entirely the issue of what Jesus is rightly said to be this foundation" (Ogden 1984g: 3). In other words, Ogden regards himself not to have forsaken the historical Jesus in his christological formulation. It is because the historical Jesus is logically prior to the "existential-historical Jesus", even though we can hardly know for sure what Jesus has done, spoken and thought, before the apostles could have any witness to him at all.

Meanwhile, the apostolic witness, or the earliest Christian witness, no matter how important it is, is only to serve as "an immediate experience" of Jesus, a means for us to establish a christological formulation.



This means that the apostolic witness, as Ogden uses the Jesus is the subject of his christological assertion. To him, the real object of the faith of Christianity is, in the end still the historical Jesus, or more precisely the ultimate reality represented by the historical Jesus. In other words, Ogden distinguishes the subject of christological assertion and the object of the faith of Christianity. And, without doubt, these two terms cannot be separated because the foundation of Christianity (the historical Jesus who represents the ultimate reality) can be known only through the apostolic witness, the proper subject of christological assertion.

## V CRITICAL REFLECTION

We are going to present some queries about Ogden's method in formulating his christology in the first half of this chapter. In the rest of the chapter, we are concerned with the relevance of Ogden's christology to our Asian situation. Though we cannot provide an analysis of the Asian situation here, we may nevertheless attempt to query the significance of his christology to us.

### 1. A Methodological Query

We now return to the question raised in chapter two. Since Ogden believes that the quest of the historical Jesus is both historically impossible and theological unnecessary, we ask, "can we infer that the apostolic witness is either historically possible or theologically revelant for us today?" (p. 25). We ask this for the reason that his christology is based on the apostolic witness rather than the historical Jesus. In fact, as we have seen, Ogden believes we should reconstruct the apostolic witness from the earliest layer of christian witness through historical-critical study of the New Testament. At the same time, he justifies the kerygma of Paul, which is not the apostolic witness in the strict sense, as appropriate one



theologically because it "opens up, in effect, the same possibility of self-understanding before God that Jesus called persons to realize . . ." (PC 111).

If we do not misinterpret Ogden, he has got two criteria in judging what is appropriate to the apostolic witness (as stated in chapter one implicitly, p. 5). The historicity of the theological criterion of accepting a witness as the christological base does not seem to really matter at all. In other words, Ogden needs a theological justification of the apostolic witness more than its historical origin, at least, as far as the example of Paul is concerned.

It is also problematic whether Ogden can determine precisely what the real apostolic witness is. For example, the sermon of Peter and other apostles in Acts 2, which is supposed to be part of the earliest witness about Jesus, was redacted some decades after their witness. Though Paul himself did not bear the witness directly to the historical Jesus, but only the revelation of the risen Christ (Gal 1: 11-12, Act 26: 13-18), his writings as we have them in New Testament actually predated much of the later recorded materials in the Gospels and Acts. But, without a doubt, Ogden insists that they are theologically justified as the subject of christology.



If Ogden then reconstructs the apostolic witness, as he reconstructs the meaning of the kerygma of Paul, existentially, he inevitably relies on his own interpretation. This interpretation follows the norm of credibility, according to our common human existence and reason. Furthermore, it is also questionable whether Ogden arbitrarily chooses some suitable texts for his own purpose in formulating the christology of love and freedom. Does Ogden regard other texts concerning the apostolic witness to be not so primitive? Or are these texts not really concerned with the apostolic witness? What are the criteria of such a distinction? Hence, the quest of the apostolic witness meets the same historical difficulty as the quest of the historical Jesus does.

If Ogden, on the other hand, admits that the apostolic witness he uses is not the most primitive one, how can he argue for their authority on which his revisionary christology is based. In Hick's view, if they are not divinely authorized, we should have no reason to give such an importance to their "melange of ideas, symbols, and myths expressed by second- and third- generation Christians. . ." (Hick 1984: 366).



Nevertheless, we may understand that Ogden emphasizes the apostolic witness because it is based on the "immediate experience" of the historical Jesus by the earliest Christians. And we can no longer have this immediate experience of that historical figure any more. Thus, the apostles' experience and interpretation of the historical Jesus is unique in history, which makes them so precious to us.

Needless to say, as a contemporary theologian, Ogden's two criteria of appropriateness and credibility are of his major concerns. He cannot forsake Christian faith or human reason. This is the reason why he praises so much Bultmann's de-mythologizing program, in saying that Bultmann's attempt to find a right philosophy (existentialism) is a brilliantly significant method for solving our theological problem today (Ogden 1966b: 106-108).

It is understood that philosophy requires human reason and Christian faith is beyond human reason in some aspects, e.g. to understand the content of speaking of Jesus as both man and God. Bultmann's de-mythologizing and existential interpretation program is, in a way, to bridge the ancient message of the New Testament and contemporary philosophy (existentialism). His proposal is thus



an attempt in solving the difficulties of understanding the Christian message today. To Ogden, the greatness of Bultmann's insight of finding a contemporary philosophy in explicating the Christian faith may be compared with Thomas Aquinas' in his time (Ogden 1966b: 106).

As a revisionary theologian, Ogden finds that existentialism alone, as Bultmann proposed, is not enough in explicating the Christian faith. It is because, by using existentialism, we can never talk objectively about God, who is the ultimate concern of the Christian faith. And he finds that process theology does better in talking objectively about God. Or we may say that Ogden is in a position again in relating contemporary philosophy and the Christian faith which are of his two major concerns.

It is clear that Ogden believes that we can never know exactly what Jesus really was through purely historical inquiry. He also believes that the apostolic witness intends to convey to us that Jesus Christ is the decisive re-presentation of the ultimate reality to human beings. And christology should then be based on the apostolic witness.



But, it is questionable whether Ogden does justice to the Christian faith when he attempts to construct a christology which is credible to human understanding as well as appropriate to the apostolic witness. It is because he puts human understanding prior to the Christian faith. Will he then sacrifice some important aspects of the Christian faith in formulating his christology? Will he miss, intended or unintended, some important parts of the apostolic witness? Is it legitimate to neglect the data of the historical Jesus in formulating a christology? There is an assumption behind our criticism: even though we cannot know exactly what Jesus was, the data concerning the historical Jesus we have got, through historical inquiry, should not be abandoned completely in our christological formulation.

Further, what will be Ogden's attitude if the apostolic witness has made a mistake or has missed an important aspect of the historical Jesus during their interpretation? For example, Jesus himself lived under an eschatological background and he was inevitably being affected (Bultmann 1958: 32). It is clear that the apostles was expecting that Jesus Christ would come back to the earth soon.



This eschatological expectation is questionable today for Jesus Christ has not yet come back after two thousand years! Could the apostles have made a mistake in believing so?

It seems that Ogden will not then lessen the importance of the apostolic witness; otherwise his christological ground would be shaken. On the contrary, he will probably argue that the apostolic witness, as the kerygma of Paul, has already made an existential interpretation of the historical Jesus. We may infer then that the apostles might have changed what Jesus was in their witness, according to their existential necessity. Or they might be wrongly expecting that Jesus Christ would come back soon. In other words, the apostolic witness thus presented by Ogden need not be appropriate to the truth of the historical Jesus himself, but rather be credible to the meaning of the Jesus for thier existence.

Similarly, we may also query further whether Ogden does justice to the apostolic witness when he interprets it in his christological formulation. For example, resurrection is, at least, a central theme of the apostolic witness (Act 2: 14-36). But Ogden has not given a clear place for resur-



rection in his christology. We may assume again Ogden will argue that he has also made an existential interpretation of the apostolic witness to the resurrection when he is being challenged that he ignores it in his christological formulation. Otherwise, he will fall into the difficulty of abandoning the resurrection.

From the above consideration, it is clear that Ogden is concerned with the meaning rather than the historical truth of the historical Jesus and the apostolic witness. It is because, to Ogden, whatever the Christian message has to be understandable to us and be relevant to our authentic existence.

Again, in other words, if we do not misinterpret Ogden, he has one final criterion, namely, credibility, instead of two. It is because the content of Ogden's christology have already determined what kind of the apostolic witness in the New Testament he uses. Or this interpretation of the apostolic witness is according to the criterion of credibility. When the appropriateness (to the apostolic witness) is not in harmony with the credibility of our human existence or reason, Ogden is forced to choose the latter; otherwise, his chris-

tological foundation will be shaken.

Therefore, it is our expectation that Ogden should include the resurrection and some other historical data concerning the historical Jesus from historical-critical study of the Bible in his christological formulation.

## 2. An Asian Query

As Asians, we are especially concerned with Ogden's christology of love and freedom, to see whether it is relevant to our context. Ogden has not started his christology from the absoluteness of Jesus Christ, as many theologians do. If the Christian message starts from the absoluteness of Christ, it will present many difficulties to Asian Christians living in non-Christian Asian cultures.

Now, Ogden starts his christologies by identifying the contemporary quest for freedom and justice. Even though he analyzes the situation in the west, the quest for freedom and justice applies to the contemporary Asian situation too. The need for freedom and justice is universal. In Asia, many



are deprived of basic human rights. Social, economical, political, and cultural injustices are rampant everywhere.

The assertion that Jesus is the Liberator may thus be very suitable for our Asian situation. Starting from this common ground, Ogden's christology would be quite relevant to our context.

Ogden regards that the function of Jesus is in his decisive re-presentation of the ultimate reality and its meaning for us. The most important component is not Jesus in himself, but the ultimate reality and human existence, which he believes, in so far as the christological question is concerned. As Asians, we would like to ask the question of the meaning of "decisive". Does it mean, e.g., that Jesus is the only or exclusive representation of ultimate reality available to all humankind?

Is it possible to replace Jesus by some other ancient Masters, like Buddha and Confucius, who might have the same function as Jesus, or the same position as the decisive re-presentation of the ultimate reality and its meaning for us?

If the most primary importance of religion is the relation between the ultimate reality and human beings. and hence our authentic existence, the form of the bridge, or the decisive representation of the ultimate reality for us is only secondary. As Asians, we may very well ask why Jesus should be the sole bridge between the ultimate reality and all human beings, including those who do not know Jesus. In his Western context, it seems natural for Ogden in their places and times to put the ultimate reality, self, and Jesus Christ together. But, in the Asian context, will Ogden admit another like Buddha or Confucius to replace Jesus Christ's position in this series of inseparable components? Perhaps Ogden will not find it easy to reject this question on the credibility side. But by the criterion of appropriateness, how would he meet this question?

Nevertheless, Ogden's understanding of the position of Jesus will definitely enrich the dialogue of religions and cultures. This, in a way, might contribute to a critical understanding of the mission of church in Asia.



## CONCLUSION

To sum up the whole thesis, we have presented the criteria of appropriateness and credibility as Ogden's basic concepts in christological formulation. He believes that christology has to be appropriate to the apostolic witness, which is based on the historical Jesus. The authority of the apostolic witness thus derives from him. Besides, christology has to be credible to common human experience and reason; otherwise, it is irrelevant to us.

Based on the earliest witness of Jesus Christ, Ogden interprets that this witness is an existential one. It is concerned with three inseparable questions. They are "Who is God?", "Who am I?", and "Who is Jesus?". At the same time, knowing the inadequacy of talking about God objectively in existentialist terms, he further employs process theology to explicate the Christian faith by talking about the structure and moral implication of God or ultimate reality.

Having established these criteria, Ogden rejects traditional christologies as well as modern revisionary christologies. He rejects traditional christologies because firstly the world view in the New Testament's time and hence their understand-



ing of human existence are different from ours. We can no longer understand their message literally. Secondly, the metaphysical presuppositions of these traditional christologies are outmoded. They can neither do justice to the humanity of Jesus Christ, nor give any real content of their talk of Jesus as both God and man.

He rejects revisionary christologies because they are not so "revisionary", but they tend to stand close with the traditional position by asking the same question, "Who is Jesus?". There are three points on which he believes revisionary theologians are inadequate. Firstly, they ask "Who is Jesus?" as the only question that christology does, instead of three inseparable questions as Ogden proposes. Secondly, they treat the historical Jesus as the subject of christology, but can never know exactly what Jesus really was. Thirdly, they try to reconstruct the faith, consciousness, or self-understanding of Jesus in order to make christological assertions to Jesus. But, their reconstructions are historically impossible as well as theologically unnecessary. On the other hand, Ogden insists whatever christological assertions, they should assert Jesus as the decisive re-presentation of the ultimate reality and its meaning for us.



Ogden argues that the assertion "Jesus is the Liberator" is appropriate to the apostolic witness, and is credible to common human experience and reason. This assertion is appropriate to the meaning of the apostolic witness because the apostolic witness contains the message of freedom, which we need today. For credibility, he uses a common concept, love, to characterize the structure of ultimate reality. Furthermore, he draws a moral implication for us from this structure of ultimate reality.

We discuss the problem of the apostolic witness and the historical Jesus, as a methodological consideration of Ogden's christology in chapter four. Ogden argues that we can no longer know exactly what the historical Jesus really was. Any christology which is based on the historical Jesus will be at the risk of historical uncertainty. On the other hand, he believes that the historical Jesus is theologically unnecessary in formulating a christology. It is because historical fact and the interpretation of this fact are not in the same level. What we today need is the theological construction concerning the historical Jesus by the apostles, i.e., the apostolic witness, or the "existential-historical Jesus". It is because this wit-



ness forms the Christian canon. Christology today should then be appropriate to that Christian canon.

Ogden further clarifies his stand point about the apostolic witness when J. Hick challenges that Ogden forsakes Jesus Christ as the foundation of Christianity. Ogden argues that the "existential-historical Jesus" of the apostolic witness is rooted in the historical Jesus, even we cannot know him exactly.

From the above argument, we observe that Ogden does not forsake Jesus as the final foundation of christology and Christianity theoretically. But Hick, on a historical side, challenges that Ogden practically ignores resurrection, a historical fact concerning Jesus, in his christology.

In the final chapter, we query whether Ogden has got one final criterion of credibility among the two. It seems that he has set up what he regards as credible for today before he interprets some apostolic witness in the New Testament, in formulating the christology of love and freedom. It is also questionable whether Ogden can get the real apostolic witness. We believe that the quest for the apostolic witness meets the same historical



difficulty as well as the quest for the historical Jesus. It is because there are many layers of the earliest Christian witnesses that we cannot identify which is the most primitive one among all the earliest witnesses, even though we may find them out historically.

Finally, we appreciate Ogden's christology by asserting Jesus is the Liberator. It is because in our Asian context, everywhere people need freedom, especially in a unjust society. Ogden's understanding of Jesus' position, as the decisive representation of the ultimate reality and its meaning for us, may enrich the dialogue of inter-religions and cultures.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

## 1. Published Writings of Schubert M. Ogden

### Abbreviations:

<u>CA</u>	= <u>Christian Advocate</u>
<u>CC</u>	= <u>The Christian Century</u>
<u>C&amp;C</u>	= <u>Christianity and Crisis</u>
<u>C&amp;S</u>	= <u>Christianity and Society</u>
<u>CTSR</u>	= <u>The Chicago Theological Seminary Register</u>
<u>DSN</u>	= <u>The Divinity School News</u>
<u>JAAR</u>	= <u>The Journal of the American Academy of Religion</u>
<u>JBR</u>	= <u>The Journal of Bible and Religion</u>
<u>JR</u>	= <u>The Journal of Religion</u>
<u>PS</u>	= <u>Process Studies</u>
<u>PSTJ</u>	= <u>The Perkins School of Theology Journal</u>
<u>RE</u>	= <u>Religious Education</u>
<u>RL</u>	= <u>Religion in Life</u>
<u>USQR</u>	= <u>Union Seminary Quarterly Review</u>
<u>WB</u>	= <u>The Westminster Bookman</u>
<u>ZThK</u>	= <u>Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche</u>

1953 a "Time, Eternity, and a New Liberalism." Quest, 2, 1: 1-14

b "Creation, Redemption, and the Divine Dependence: A Reply." Quest, 2, 2: 6-8

1954 Review: George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy. C&S, 19, 4: 29-31

1955 a "'Every One Who Is of the Truth. . . .'" DSN, 22, 1: 1-8



- b     Review: E. La B. Cherbonnier, Hardness of Heart: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Doctrine of Sin. C&S, 20, 4: 26-28
- 1956   a     "Davida Boyd Lewis in memoriam." DSN, 23, 2: 17-18
- b     "Reflections on Parish Week." The Log, 7, 4: 3
- c     Review: Friedrich Gogarten, Demythologizing and History. CTSR, 46, 2: 80-81
- 1957   a     "Bultmann's Project of Demythologization and the Problem of Theology and Philosophy." JR, 37: 156-173
- b     Review: Martin J. Heineken, The Moment before God: An Interpretation of Kierkegaard. PSTJ, 10, 2: 22-24
- c     Review: Hans Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. JR, 37: 131-132
- d     Review: Geraint Vaughan Jones, Christology and Myth in the New Testament. CTSR, 47, 5: 17-19
- e     Review: Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 2. The Dallas Times Herald, Roundup, 28 July: 19
- f     Review: Arthur F. Smethurst, Modern Science and Christian Beliefs. JR, 37: 267-268
- g     Review: Samuel M. Thompson, A Modern Philosophy of Religion. PSTJ, 11, 1: 42-43
- h     Review: Roger L. Shinn, Life, Death, and Destiny. PSTJ, 11, 1: 43-44
- i     Review: David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief. PSTJ, 11, 1: 44-46
- j     Review: Gustaf Wingren, Luther on Vocation. PSTJ, 11, 1: 46-47
- k     Review: Leslie Newbigin, Sin and Salvation. PSTJ, 11, 1: 47-48



- 1958 a "Destiny and Fate." In A Handbook of Christian Theology, ed. Arthur A. Cohen and Marvin Halverson. New York: Meridian Books: 77-80
- b "The Concern of the Theologian." In Christian and Communism, ed. Merrimon Cuninggim. Dallas, TX: SMU Press: 58-74
- c Review: George W. Davis, Existentialism and Theology. JR, 38: 66-67
- d Review: David E. Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion. PSTJ, 11, 2 & 3: 52-53
- e Review: George C. Hackman, et al., Religion in Modern Life. PSTJ, 11, 2 & 3: 53-54
- f Review: William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of Immortality in Human Experience. JR, 38: 141-142
- g Review: Albert Camus, Caligula and Three Other Plays. The Dallas Times Herald, Roundup, 14 September: 16
- h Review: F. D. Maurice, Theological Essays. CC, 75: 1081-1082
- i Review: William Inge, Four Plays. The Dallas Times Herald, Roundup, 12 October: 17
- j Review: Louis Schneider and Sanford M. Dornbush, Popular Religion. The Dallas Times Herald, Roundup, 26 October: 21
- k Review: Martin Buber, I and Thou (2nd ed.). The Dallas Times Herald, Roundup, 23 November: 10
- l Review: Martin Werner, The Formation of Christian Dogma. CC, 75: 1513-1514
- 1959 a "The Situation in Contemporary Protestant Theology, 4: Systematic Theology." PSTJ, 12, 2: 13-20
- b "The Debate on 'Demythologizing'." JBR, 27: 17-27



- c "May a Christian Smoke?" The Log, 9, 14:2
  - d "The Quest for Theological Adequacy."  
Letter to Laymen, 5, 9:1, 5-6
  - e "The Old Meaning in New Words and the New  
Meaning in Old Words: A Conversation with  
Schubert Ogden." Letter to Laymen, 5, 10:  
5-6
  - f Translation: Rudolf Bultmann, "Eternal Light  
of Christian." CC, 76: 1465-1466
  - g Review: William Temple, Religious Experience  
and Other Essays and Addresses. CC, 76: 19-20
  - h Review: Nathan A. Scott, Jr. (ed.), The Tragic  
Vision and the Christian Faith. JR, 39: 65-66
  - i Review: John C. Bennett, Christians and the  
State. Dallas Times Herald, Roundup, 15  
March: 19
  - j Review: R.J.W. Bevan (ed.), Steps to Christ-  
ian Understanding. PSTJ, 12, 3: 26-27
  - k Review: Emile Brehier, The Philosophy of  
Plotinus. PSTJ, 12, 3: 27
  - l Review: A. roy Eckardt, The Surge of Piety  
in America. WB, 18, 2: 24-25
  - m Review: Henri de Lubac, S.J., Catholicism.  
CC, 76: 923
  - n Review: Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to  
Metaphysics. CC, 76: 1056
  - o Review: Walter Leibrecht (ed.), Religion and  
Culture: Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich.  
PSTJ, 13, 1: 27-28
  - p Review: Paperback publications in the general  
field of religion, Spring-Summer, 1959. PSTJ,  
13, 1: 41-42
- 
- 1960 a "An Adequate Theology for Our Time." CA,  
4, 18: 7-8
  - b "The Lordship of Jesus Christ: The Meaning  
of Our Affirmation." Encounter, 21: 408-422
  - c "The Right to Celebrate the Reformation."  
The Pulpit, 31: 302-304



- d edition and translation: Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann. New York: Meridian Books
- e Translation: Rudolf Bultmann, "On Behalf of Christian Freedom." JR, 40: 95-99
- f Translation: Rudolf Bultmann, "Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible? Encounter, 21: 194-200
- g Review: F. H. Cleobury, Christian Rationalism and Philosophical Analysis. CC, 77: 192-193
- h Review: Paul Hessert, Introduction to Christianity. JR, 40: 53-54
- i Review: Robert M. Grant, Gnosticism and Early Christianity, CTSR, 5), 1: 2-3
- j Review: Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth. PSTJ, 13, 2: 43
- k Review: William Strunk, Jr., The Elements of Style. PSTJ, 13, 2: 48-49
- l Review: L. Malevez, S.J., The Christian Message and Myth. CC, 77: 949-950
- m Review: Carl Michalson, The Hinge of History. JR, 40: 217-219
- n Review: Rudolf Bultmann, This World and the Beyond. CA, 4, 26: 17
- o Review: Rudolf Bultmann, this World and the Beyond. WB, 19, 4: 8-9
- p Review: Dagobert D. Runes, Pictorial History of Philosophy. PSTJ, 14, 1: 42
- 1961 a Christ without Myth: A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. New York: Harper & Brothers
- b "Liturgical Worship?" Motive, 22, 1: 14
- c Edition and translation: Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann. London: Hodder and Stoughton



- d Translation: Rudolf Bultmann, "Children of Light." Motive, 22, 3: 6-9
- e Review: Franklin H. Littell, The German Phoenix. The Dallas Morning News, Sec. 5, 15 January: 6
- f Review: Jaroslav Pelikan, Luther the Expositor. PSTJ, 14, 2: 49-50
- g Review: Theodore G. Tappert (ed.), The Book of Concord. PSTJ, 14, 2: 51-52
- h Review: Giovanni Miegge, Gospel and Myth in the Thought of Rudolf Bultmann. PSTJ, 14, 2: 54-55
- i Review: Paperback publications in the general field of religion, Fall-Winter, 1960-61. PSTJ, 14, 2: 57-58
- j Review: William A. Chriatian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics. PSTJ, 14, 3: 49
- k Review: Rollo May (ed.), Symbolism in Religion and Literature. JR, 41: 325-326
- l Review: John W. Doberstein (ed.), Minster's Prayer Book and Robert N. Rodenmayer (ed.), The Pastor's Prayer Book. PSTJ, 15, 1: 64-65
- 1962 a Christ without Myth: A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. London: Collins
- b "The Significance of Rudolf Bultmann." PSTJ, 15, 2: 5-17
- c "Wie neu ist die 'Neue Frage nach dem historischen Jesus'?" ZThK, 59: 46-87 (with Van A. Harvey)
- d "Bultmann and the 'New Quest'." JBR, 30: 209-218
- e "'You also Should Do as I Have Done to You'." Perkins Perspective, 5, 1: 1, 3-4
- f Translation: Rudolf Bultmann, "On the Problem of Demythologizing." JR, 42: 96-102
- g Review: Harold E. Fey (ed.), How My Mind Has Changed. CC, 79: 17



- h Review: Wilhelm Pauck, The Heritage of the Reformation (2d ed.). PSTJ, 15, 2: 38-39
- i Review: John Macquarrie, The Scope of De-mythologizing. PSTJ, 15, 2: 40-41
- j Review: Paperback publications in the general field of religion, Fall-Winter, 1961-62. PSTJ, 15, 2: 60-61
- k Review: June Bingham, Courage to Change: An Introduction to the Life and Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. PSTJ, 15, 3: 45-46
- l Review: Gerhard Ebeling, The Nature of Faith. PSTJ, 15, 3: 46-47
- m Review: H. R. Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture. PSTJ, 15, 3: 48-49
- n Review: Carl E. Braaten and Roy A. Harrisville (eds.), Kerygma and History: A Symposium on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. CA, 6, 20: 17
- o Review: Carl E. Braaten and Roy A. Harrisville (eds.), Kerygma and History: A Symposium on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. PSTJ, 16, 1: 52-53
- 1963 a "The Understanding of Theology in Ott and Bultmann." In New Frontiers in Theology, 1: The Latter Heidegger and Theology, ed. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. New York: Harper & Row: 157-173
- b "'This Generation Will Not Pass Away. . . .'" In Sermons to Intellectuals from Three Continents, ed. Franklin H. Littell. New York: Macmillan Co: 123-134
- c "What Sense Does It Make to Say, 'God Acts in History'?" JR, 43: 1-19
- d "Who Represents Christ?" C&C, 23: 115-118
- e "Honest to God." CA, 7, 14: 7-8
- f "Beyond Supernaturalism." RL, 33: 7-18



- g     Review: Robert W. Bretall (ed.), The Empirical Theology of Henry Nelson Wieman. Theology Today, 20: 424-425
- h     Review: Kenneth Cauthen, The Impact of American Religious Liberalism. PSTJ, 17, 1: 42
- i     Review: Charles Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection. PSTJ, 17, 1: 47-48
- 1964 a     "Theology and Philosophy: A New Phase of the Discussion." JR, 44: 1-16
- b     "How New Is the 'New Quest of the Historical Jesus'?" In The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Roy A. Harrisville. New York: Abingdon: 197-242 (with Van A. Harvey)
- c     "Zur Frage der 'richtigen' Philosophie." ZThK, 61: 103-124
- d     "Der Begriff der Theologie bei Ott und Bultmann." In Der spätere Heidegger und die Theologie, ed. James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. Zurich: Zwingli Verlag: 187-205
- e     "The Temporality of God." In Zeit und Geschichte, Dankesgabe an Rudolf Bultmann zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. Erich Dinkler. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr: 381-398
- f     "Bultmann's Demythologizing and Hartshorne's Dipolar Theism." In Process and Divinity: The Hartshorne Festschrift, ed. William L. Reese and Eugene Freeman. LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publishing Co.: 493-513
- g     Edition and translation: Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann. London: Collins
- h     Review: John A.T. Robinson, Honest to God. The SMU Campus, 49, 30: 4
- i     Review: Paul M. van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel. RE, 59: 184-185



- j     Review: Carl Michalson, The Rationality of Faith. WB, 23, 1: 9-10
- k     Review: Gerhard Ebeling, Word and Faith, CA, 8, 14: 15-16
- l     Review: Kenneth Cauthen, The Impact of American Religious Liberalism. The Church School, 17, 11: 17
- m     Review: Carl Michalson, The Rationality of Faith. PSTJ, 17, 2 & 3: 45-46
- n     Review: Paul M. van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel. PSTJ, 17, 2 & 3: 50-51
- o     Review: John F. Porter and William J. Wolf (eds.), Toward the Recovery of Unity: The Thought of Frederick Denison Maurice. CA, 8, 25: 18-19
- p     Review: Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion. PSTJ, 18, 1: 41-42
- q     Review: Frank N. Magill (ed.), Masterpieces of World Philosophy in Summary Form and Masterpieces of Christian Literature in Summary Form. PSTJ, 18, 1: 44
- r     Review: Ninian Smart (ed.), Historical Selections in the Philosophy of Religion. PSTJ, 18, 1: 44-45
- 
- 1965   a     "Myth and Truth." McCormick Quarterly, 18, Special Supplement: 57-76
- b     "The Possibility and Task of Philosophical Theology." USQR, 20: 271-279
- c     "Intercessory Prayer in the Life of the Church." The Log, 14, 5: 7-8
- d     "The Christian and Unbelievers." Motive, 25, 8: 21-23
- e     "Theology and Objectivity." JR, 45: 175-195
- f     "Welch's Polemic: A Reply." Theology Today, 22: 275-277
- g     "Faith and Truth." CC, 82: 1057-1060



- h      Review: William A. Christian, Meaning and Truth in Religion. PSTJ, 18, 3: 57
- i      Review: John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology. CA, 9, 18: 11-12
- 1966   a      The Reality of God and Other Essays. New York: Harper & Row
- b      "The Significance of Rudolf Bultmann for Contemporary Theology." In The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, ed. Charles W. Kegley. New York: Harper & Row: 104-126
- c      "Love Unbounded: The Doctrine of God." PSTJ, 19, 3: 5-17
- d      "The Christian Proclamation of God to Men of the So-Called 'Atheistic Age'," In Is God Dead?, ed. Johannes Metz. New York: Paulist Press: 89-98
- e      "The Permanent Reformation." Classmate, 74, 2: 30-32
- f      Review: William A. Christian, Meaning and Truth in Religion. PSTJ, 19, 1 & 2: 64-65
- g      Review: John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology. RE, 61: 146
- 1967   a      The Reality of God and Other Essays. London: SCM Press
- b      Theology in Crisis: A Colloquium on the Credibility of "God". New Concord, OH: Muskingum College (with Charles Hartshorne)
- c      "Faith and Truth." In Frontline Theology, ed. Dean Peerman. Richmond, VA: John Knox Press: 126-133
- d      "How Does God Function in Human Life?" C&C, 27, 8: 105-108
- e      "On Demythologizing." Pittsburgh Perspective, 8:2: 27-35



- f " 'Ask and It Will Be Given You'." In Rockefeller Chapel Sermons, ed. Donovan E. Smucker. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 98-109
- g "Karl Rahner: Theologian of Open Catholicism." CA 11, 17: 11-13
- h Translation: Rudolf Bultmann, "General Truths and Christian Proclamation." Journal for Theology and the Church, 4: History and Hermeneutics. New York: Harper & Row: 153-162
- i Review: Karl Rahner, S.J. and Herbert Vorgrimler, S.J., Theological Dictionary. PSTJ, 20, 1 & 2: 57
- j Review: John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology. USQR, 22: 263-264, 267
- k Review: Larry Shiner, The Secularization of History: An Introduction to the Theology of Friedrich Gogarten. The Church School, 20, 12: 29
- l Review: Ronald Gregor Smith, Secular Christianity. RL, 36: 478-479
- m Review: Fritz Buri, Theology of Existence. PSTJ, 21, 1: 50
- 1968 a "God and Philosophy: A Discussion with Antony Flew." JR, 48: 161-181
- b "The Challenge to Protestant Thought." Continuum, 6: 236-240
- c "Theology and Objectivity." In Philosophy and Religion: Some Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Jerry A. Gill. Minneapolis, MN: Burgess Publishing Co.: 205-227
- d "Glaube und Wahrheit." In Theologie im umbruch, Der Beitrag Amerikas zur gegenwartigen Theologie. Munchen: Christian Kaiser Verlag: 130-137
- e Review: Mortimer J. Adler, The Difference of Man and the Difference It Makes. PSTJ, 21, 2 & 3: 63-64



- f      Review: Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology. PSTJ, 21, 2 & 3: 64-65
- g      Review: Rene Merle, S.J., Bultmann and Christian Faith. RE, 63: 415
- 1969    a      "Present Prospects for Empirical Theology." In The Future of Empirical Theology, ed. Bernard E. Meland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 65-88
- b      "Theology and Metaphysics." Criterion, 9, 1: 15-18
- c      "On Perkins and Theological Education." The Perkins Newsletter, 3, 3: 1, 9-12
- d      Review: Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding. PSTJ, 22, 2 & 3: 118-120
- 1970      Die Realitat Gottes, trans. Kathe Gregor Smith. Zurich: Zwingli Verlag
- 1971    a      "A Christian Natural Theology?" In Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, ed. Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr., and Gene Reeves. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co.: 111-115
- b      "Toward a New Theism." In Process Philosophy and Christian Thought: 173-187
- c      "The Task of Philosophical Theology." In The Future of Philosophical Theology, ed. Robert A. Evans. Philadelphia: Westminster Press: 55-84
- d      "On Thinking Historically about Christ." CA, 15, 11: 7-8
- e      "Truth, Truthfulness, and Secularity." C&C, 31: 56-60
- f      "Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle." JR, 51: 155-172



- g "The Reality of God." In Process Theology: Basic Writings, ed. Ewert H. Cousins. New York: Newman Press: 119-135
- h "Prudence and Grace." Criterion, 11, 1: 6-8
- i Review: Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method. RE, 66: 296
- 1972 a "What Is Theology?" JR, 52: 22-40
- b "'The Reformation that We Want.'" The Anglican Theological Review, 54: 260-273
- c "Response to Jurgen Moltmann." In Hope and the Future of Man, ed. Ewert H. Cousins. Philadelphia: Fortress Press: 109-116
- d "Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle." In Language, Truth, and Meaning, ed. Philip McShane. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan: 218-235
- e Recording: "What Is Process Theology?" Thesis, 3, 9
- f Translation: Rudolf Bultmann, "Protestant Theology and Atheism." JR, 52: 331-335
- g Review: Joseph Marechal, S.J., A Marechal Reader. JR, 52: 103-104
- h Review: Levi A. Olan, Judaism and Immortality. PSTJ, 25, 2: 40-41
- 1973 a "What Is Theology?" PSTJ, 26, 2: 1-13
- b "Response." PSTJ, 26, 2: 45-57
- c Review: Frederick Herzog, Liberation Theology. RL, 42: 434-435
- d Review: John A.T. Robinson, The Human Face of God. RE, 68: 756-757
- e Review: Lyman T. Lundeen, Risk and Rhetoric in Religion: Whitehead's Theory of Language and the Discourse of Faith. PSTJ, 27, 2: 44-46



- 1974    a    "Faith and Secularity." In God, Secularization, and History: Essays in Memory of Ronald Gregor Smith, ed. Eugene Thomas Long. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press: 26-43
- b    "Falsification and Belief." Religious Studies, 10: 21-43
- c    "'Love Divine, All Loves Excelling': Theological Reflections." United Methodists Today, 1, 9: 68-71; 1, 10: 84-85
- d    "Doctrinal Standards in the United Methodist Church." PSTJ, 28, 1: 19-27
- e    "Response to Professor Connelly, 1." Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America, 29: 59-66
- f    Review: Richard R. Niebuhr, Experiential Religion. JAAR, 42: 568-570
- 
- 1975    a    "On Revelation." In Our Common History as Christians: Essays in Honor of Albert C. Outler, ed. John Deschner, Leroy T. Howe and Klaus Penzel. New York: Oxford University Press: 261-292
- b    "A Colloquy on Bernard Lonergan, B. 3." PSTJ, 28, 3: 35-37
- c    "'Theology and Falsification' in Retrospect: A Reply." In The Logic of God: Theology and Verification, ed. Malcolm L. Diamond and Thomas V. Litzenburg, Jr. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co." 290-297
- d    "The Criterion of Metaphysical Truth and the Senses of 'Metaphysics'." PS, 5: 47-48
- e    "The Meaning of Christian Hope." USQR, 30: 153-164
- f    "Christliche Theologie und die neue Religiosität." In Chancen der Religion, ed. Rainer Volp. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn: 157-174
- g    "The Point of Christology." JR, 55: 375-395



- 1976    a    "The Meaning of Christian Hope." In Religious Experience and Process Theology: The Pastoral Implications of a Major Modern Movement, ed. Harty James Cargas and Bernard Lee. New York: Paulist Press: 195-212
- b    "The Authority of Scripture for Theology." Interpretation, 30: 242-261
- c    "Christology Reconsidered: John Cobb's 'Christ in a Pluralistic Age'." PS, 6: 116-122
- d    "'I Believe in': Theological Brief.: In Christian Theology: A Case Study Approach, ed. Robert A. Evans and Thomas D. Parker. New York: Harper & Row: 41-45
- e    "Sources of Religious Authority in Liberal Protestantism." JAAR, 44: 403-416
- 1977    a    The Reality of God and Other Essays. 2d ed., New York: Harper & Row
- b    "Linguistic Analysis and Theology." Theologische Zeitschrift, 33: 318-325
- c    "Prolegomena to a Christian Theology of Nature." In A Rational Faith: Essays in Honor of Levi A. Olan, ed. Jack Bemporad. New York: Ktav Publishing House: 125-136
- d    Translation: Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Metaphysical System," A Rational Faith: Essays in Honor of Levi A. Olan: 107-123
- e    Review: Antony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism and Other Philosophical Essays on God, Freedom and Immortality. Religious Studies Review, 3: 142-144
- 1978    a    "Theology and Religious Studies: Their Difference and the Difference It Makes." JAAR, 46: 3-17
- b    "An Outline Still to Be Filled Out." CC, 95: 538-539



- c "The Books that Shape Lives: Schubert M. Ogden." CC, 95: 571
- d "Evil and Belief in God: The Distinctive Relevance of a 'Process Theology.'" In PSTJ, 31, 4: 29-34
- e "A Free-Church Answer." Why Did God Make Me?, ed. Hans Kung and Jurgen Moltmann. New York: Seabury Press: 67-73
- f "Response to Peter Berger." Theological Studies, 39: 497-502
- g Review: Jon Sobrino, S.J., Christology at the Crossroads. PSTJ, 31, 4: 47-49
  
- 1979 a Faith and Freedom: Toward a Theology of Liberation. Nashville, TN: Abingdon
- b Faith and Freedom: Toward a Theology of Liberation. Belfast: Christian Journals
- c Christ without Myth: A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. 2d ed.; Dallas: SMU Press
- d "Ethical Queries about Modern Science." Anticipation, 25: 15-17
- e "The Emancipation of Theology." The Circuit Rider, 3, 2: 3-5
- f "Theology in the Modern World." JR, 59: 472-476
- g "'Theological Education and Liberation Theology': A Response." Theological Education, 16, 1: 48-50
- h Review: Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (corrected ed.). PSTJ, 33, 1: 57
  
- 1980 a "On the Trinity." Theology, 83: 97-102
- b "Christian Theology and Neoclassical Theism." JR, 60: 205-209



- c "Faith and Freedom." CC, 97: 1241-1244
- d "The Church and Homosexual Persons: The Issue of Ordination." Perkins Newsletter, 13, 19: 7
- 1981 a "Theology in the University." In Unfinished Essays in Honor of Ray L. Hart, ed. Mark C. Taylor. Journal of the American Academy of Religion Thematic Studies, 48/1: 3-13
- b "Jews and Christians: Do We Live in the Same World? A Christian Asks the Question." PSTJ, 34, 4: 34-43
- c "The Concept of a Theology of Liberation: Must a Christian Theology Today Be So Conceived?" In The Challenge of Liberation Theology: A First World Response, ed. Brian J. Mahan and L. Dale Richesin. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books: 127-140
- d "Response to Dorothee Soelle." In The Challenge of Liberation Theology: A First World Response: 17-20
- e "Faith and Freedom." In Theologians in Transition: The Christian Century "How My Mind Has Changed" Series, ed. James M. Wall. New York: Crossroad: 100-106
- 1982 a The Point of Christology. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row
- b The Point of Christology. London: SCM Press
- c "Prolegomena to Practical Theology." PSTJ, 35, 3: 17-21
- d "Reader's Response." Church Divinity 1982, ed. John H. Morgan. Notre Dame, IN: Church Divinity Monograph Series: 128-129
- e "Adversus Judaeos? A Christian Understanding of Judaism." PS, 12: 94-97



- 1983    a    "The Convergences of Science and Religion: A Response." PSTJ, 36, 4: 15-20
- b    "Myth." In The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. Alan Richardson and John Bowden. Philadelphia: Westminster Press: 389-391
- c    "Pluralism." In The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology: 449-451
- 1984    a    "Essentials of Process Philosophy." Unitarian Universalist World, 15 February: 5
- b    "Process Theology and the Wesleyan Witness." PSTJ, 37, 3: 18-33
- c    "On Faith and Freedom: A Response to Pixley's Review." PS, 13: 232-234
- d    "Rudolf Bultmann and the Future of Revisionary Christology." In Rudolf Bultmanns Werk und Wirkung, ed Bernd Jaspert. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: 155-173
- e    "The Experience of God: Critical Reflections on Hartshorne's Theory of Analogy." In Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne, ed. John B. Cobb, Jr. and Franklin I. Gamwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 16-37
- f    Edition and translation: Rudolf Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic Writings. Philadelphia: Fortress Press
- g    "Ogden Responds to Critics." In The American Academy of Religion Newsletter. 5, 1: 1-3
- 1985    a    "Is the Gospel Message Liberating for Women?" PSTJ, 38, 3: 19-21
- b    Edition and translation: Rudolf Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic Writings. London: SCM Press

## 2. Others (Works Cited)

- Braaten, C. E.      "Sixth Locus: the Person of Christ."  
                          1984                   C. E. Braaten & R. W. Jenson ed.  
    Christian Dogmatics.    Philadelphia:  
    Fortress.    Vol. 1.
- Bultmann, R.            "New Testament and Mythology."  
                          1954                   H. W. Bartsch ed. Kerygma and Myth.  
    R. H. Fuller tr.    London: S.P.C.K.
- 1958                   Jesus Christ and Mythology.    New  
    York: Charles Scribner's Son.
- Hick, J.                   "The Foundation of Christianity:  
                                  Jesus or the Apostolic Message?"  
                                  The Journal of Religion, 64: 363-  
                                  369.







000471287